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Abstract
Constructing a Pseudo Random Function (PRF) from a pseudorandom permutation is a fundamental
problem in cryptology. Such a construction, implemented by truncating the last m bits of permutations of
{0, 1}n was suggested by Hall et al. (1998). They conjectured that the distinguishing advantage of an adver-
sary with q quesires,Advn,m(q), is small if q = o(2
(m+n)/2), established an upper bound onAdvn,m(q) that
confirms the conjecture for m < n/7, and also declared a general lower bound Advn,m(q) = Ω(q
2/2n+m).
The conjecture was essentially confirmed by Bellare and Impagliazzo in 1999. Nevertheless, the problem
of estimating Advn,m(q) remained open. Combining the trivial bound 1, the birthday bound, and a result
by Stam (1978) leads to the following upper bound:
Advn,m(q) ≤ O
(
min
{
q2
2n
,
q
2
n+m
2
, 1
})
In this paper we show that this upper bound is tight for every m < n and q > 1. This, in turn, verifies
that the converse to the conjecture of Hall et al. is also correct, i.e., that Advn,m(q) is negligible only for
q = o(2(m+n)/2).
Keywords: Pseudo random permutations, pseudo random functions, advantage.
1 Introduction
The (in)distinguishablity of a random permutation from a random function is a combinatorial problem which
has a fundamental role in cryptology. Indeed, various cryptographic primitives (block ciphers, hash and MAC
schemes) are analyzed by starting from an idealization as a random permutation. This paper discusses a
generalization of this problem.
Let ℓ, n be positive integers and let Fn,ℓ be the set of functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}ℓ. A Pseudo Random
Function (PRF) Φ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ is a selection of a function from Fn,ℓ, according to some probability
distribution. The quality of a PRF Φ is determined by the ability of an “adversary” to distinguish an instance
of Φ from a function chosen uniformly at random from Fn,ℓ, in the following setting. It is assumed that the
adversary has only query access to a function ϕ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ, which is either selected uniformly at
random from Fn,ℓ, or is an instance of the PRF Φ. The adversary may use any algorithm A that first selects
(possibly adaptively) a sequence of queries to the function, i.e., strings in {0, 1}n, and then outputs a bit. We
1
may interpret this bit as the guess of A. For b ∈ {0, 1}, let PAΦ (b) be the probability that the output is b when
ϕ is the PRF, and let PAU (b) be the probability that the output is b when ϕ is selected from Fn,ℓ uniformly
at random. The advantage of the algorithm A against the PRF Φ is defined as
∣∣PAΦ (1)− PAU (1)∣∣ (which
also equals
∣∣PAΦ (0)− PAU (0)∣∣). The advantage, AdvΦ, of the adversary against the PRF Φ is the maximal
advantage of A against Φ over all the algorithms it may use, as a function of the number of queries (when the
PRF Φ is clear from the context, we omit it and simply write Adv). Hereafter, we consider adversaries with
no computational limitations where the advantage has an explicit expression (see Section 2).
PRF based on a permutation. The classical example of a PRF from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}n is a permutation
of {0, 1}n, chosen uniformly at random. In this case, the advantage of the PRF (i.e., the maximal advantage
over all possible adversaries) is
Adv(q) = 1−
(
1− 1
2n
)(
1− 2
2n
)
. . .
(
1− q − 1
2n
)
,
achieved by an adversary that executes the collision test (i.e., submits q distinct queries and outputs 1 if no
two replies are equal, and 0 otherwise). In particular, Adv(q) = 1 for q > 2n. An approximation for Adv(q)
for q ≤ 2n can be obtained by the following inequalities. For every 1 ≤ k ≤ q − 1 we have(
1− k
2n
)(
1− q − k
2n
)
≥ 1− q
2n
,
and hence
Adv(q) ≤ 1−
(
1− q
2n
) q−1
2 ≤ min
{
q(q − 1)
2n+1
, 1
}
.
On the other hand,(
1− 1
2n
)(
1− 2
2n
)
. . .
(
1− q − 1
2n
)
≤ 1(
1 + 12n
) (
1 + 22n
)
. . .
(
1 + q−12n
) ≤ 1
1 + 1+2+...+(q−1)2n
=
1
1 + q(q−1)2n+1
,
and hence
Adv(q) ≥ 1− 1
1 + q(q−1)2n+1
=
q(q−1)
2n+1
1 + q(q−1)2n+1
≥
q(q−1)
2n+1
2max
{
1, q(q−1)2n+1
} = 1
2
min
{
q(q − 1)
2n+1
, 1
}
.
Therefore,
Adv(q) = Θ
(
min
{
q2/2n, 1
})
. (1)
This implies that the number of queries required to distinguish a random permutation from a random function,
with success probability significantly larger than, say, 1/2, is Θ(2n/2). In other words, a permutation can be
used safely (e.g., as a one-time-pad) as long as the number of outputs (q) that it produces is sufficiently lower
than 2n/2.
A generalization of the above PRF is the following.
Definition 1.1 (Truncated Permutation PRF). Let TRUNCn,m : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−m be defined by the mapping
(x1, x2, . . . xn) 7→ (x1, x2, . . . xn−m). The ”Truncated permutation” PRF is the PRF defined by the composition
TRUNCn,m ◦ π, where π is a permutation of {0, 1}n, chosen uniformly at random.
2
Notation. The advantage of an (computationally unbounded) adversary against the Truncated Permutation
PRF is denoted by Advn,m.
The following problem arises naturally.
Problem 1. For every 0 ≤ m < n and q, find (the order of magnitude of) Advn,m(q).
A different, related, problem is the following.
Problem 2. For every 0 ≤ m < n, how many queries does the adversary need in order to gain non-
negligible advantage against the Truncated Permutation PRF? Specifically, what is (the order of magnitude)
of q1/2(n,m) = min{q | Advn,m(q) ≥ 1/2}?
We proceed to describe a short history of these problems.
The Birthday Bound. We start by remarking that the classical ‘birthday bounds’
Advn,m(q) ≤ min
{
q(q − 1)
2n+1
, 1
}
, (2)
and q1/2(n,m) = Ω(2
n/2) are obviously valid. Every algorithm that the adversary can use with the truncated
replies of (n −m) bits from π(w) (w ∈ {0, 1}n) can also be used by the adversary who sees the full π(w) (it
can simply ignore m bits and apply the same algorithm). Of course, we expect ‘better’ bounds that would
reflect the fact that the adversary receives less information when f(w) is truncated, and would allow for using
the outputs of a (truncated) permutation for significantly more than 2n/2 times.
Hall et al. (1998). Problems 1 and 2 were studied by Hall et al. [6] in 1998, where the truncated (random)
permutation were proposed as a PRF construction. The authors of [6] declared the lower bound
Advn,m(q) = Ω(q
2/2n+m), (3)
for every 0 ≤ m < n and q ≤ 2(n+m)/2. This bound implies that q1/2(n,m) = O(2(n+m)/2) for every
0 ≤ m < n. Unfortunately, the paper [6] does not provide a credible proof of (3), and the techniques studied
therein do not lead to that result. We attribute this to a mistake/omission, and therefore refer to (3) only as
a “declared” result1. Hall et al. (1998) also proved the following upper bound:
Advn,m(q) ≤ 5
(
q
2
n+m
2
) 2
3
+
1
2
(
q
2
n+m
2
)3
1
2
n−7m
2
(4)
For m ≤ n/7 this implies that q1/2(n,m) = Ω(2(m+n)/2). However, for larger values of m, the bound on
q1/2(n,m) that is offered by (4) deteriorates, and becomes (already for m > n/4) worse than the trivial
birthday bound q1/2(n,m) = Ω(2
n/2). Hall et al. [6] conjectured that an adversary needs Ω(2(n+m)/2) queries
in order to get non-negligible advantage, in the general case.
Bellare and Impagliazzo (1999). Bellare and Impagliazzo derived the following result in 1999 [1, Theorem
4.2].
Advn,m(q) = O(n)
q
2
n+m
2
(5)
whenever 2n−m < q < 2
n+m
2 . This implies that q 1
2
= Ω( 1n2
m+n
2 ) for m > 13n+
2
3 log2 n+Ω(1).
1Unfortunately, the paper [6] only provide a sketch of proof of (3) and claims that the computation may be completed by
using techniques presented in the paper. This does not seem to be the case. We therefore refer to (3) only as a ‘declared’ result
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Gilboa and Gueron (2015). The method used to show (4) can be pushed to prove the conjecture made
in [6], thus settling Problem 2, for almost every m. In particular, [2] showed that
Advn,m(q) ≤


2 3
√
2
(
q
2
n+m
2
) 2
3
+ 2
√
2√
3
(
q
2
n+m
2
) 3
2
+
(
q
2
n+m
2
)2
m ≤ n3
3
(
q
2
n+m
2
) 2
3
+ 2
(
q
2
n+m
2
)
+ 5
(
q
2
n+m
2
)2
+ 12
(
2q
2
n+m
2
) n
n−m n
3 < m ≤ n− log2(16n),
(6)
which implies that q1/2(n,m) = Ω(2
m+n
2 ) for every 0 ≤ m ≤ n− log2(16n).
Stam (1978). Surprisingly, it turns out that Problem 2 was solved 20 years before Hall et al. [6], in a
different context. The bound
Advn,m(q) ≤ 1
2
√
(2n−m − 1)q(q − 1)
(2n − 1)(2n − (q − 1)) ≤
1
2
√
1− q−12n
· q
2
n+m
2
, (7)
which is valid for every 0 ≤ m < n and q ≤ 2n, follows directly from a result of Stam [7, Theorem 2.3]. This
implies that q1/2(n,m) = Ω(2
(m+n)/2) for every 0 ≤ m < n, confirming the conjecture of [6] in all generality
(20 years before the conjecture was raised). We point out that the bound in [7] can be simplified to the more
amenable form
Advn,m(q) ≤ q
2
m+n
2
, q ≤ 3
4
2n (8)
This settles Problem 2, but note that Problem 1 still remains quite open.
The best known bounds for Problem 1. Note that the bound (7) is tighter than the bounds (4), (5) and
(6). Therefore, summarizing the above results, the best known upper bound for the advantage in Problem 1,
is the one obtained by combining (2) and (7), namely
Advn,m(q) ≤ min
{
q(q − 1)
2n+1
,
1
2
√
(2n−m − 1)q(q − 1)
(2n − 1)(2n − (q − 1)) , 1
}
= Θ
(
min
{
q2
2n
,
q
2
n+m
2
, 1
})
, (9)
whereas the only general lower bound that we are aware of is the bound (3), declared in [6]. By (1), we know
that the bound (9) is tight if m = 0, and it was shown in [3] that it is tight also in the case m = n− 1.
Our contribution. In this paper we answer Problem 1 by showing that (9) is tight for every q > 1, as
formulated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1.2. Assume m < n, q > 1. Then
Advn,m(q) = Θ
(
min
{
q2
2n
,
q
2
n+m
2
, 1
})
.
In particular, note that this implies that the bound (3) is, in general, not tight.
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2 Notation and Preliminaries
We fix 0 ≤ m < n and q ≥ 1. Let:
Ω :=
({0, 1}n−m)q .
We view Ω as the set of all possible sequences of replies that the adversary gets for his q queries. We remark
here that in our problem, we may assume that all the queries are fixed and distinct (and hence q ≤ 2n). For
every ω = (ωi)
q
i=1 ∈ Ω, α ∈ {0, 1}n−m let
dα(ω) := #{1 ≤ i ≤ q | ωi = α}.
For every positive t, let W (0, t) := 1 and for every positive integer k,
W (k, t) :=
k−1∏
j=0
(
1− j
t
)
.
For ω ∈ Ω, let
R(ω) :=
∏
α∈{0,1}n−m W (dα(ω), 2
m)
W (q, 2n)
.
As in Section 1, consider an adversary that has only query access to a function ϕ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−m,
which is either selected uniformly at random from Fn,n−m, or is TRUNCn,m ◦ π, where π is a permutation of
{0, 1}n, chosen uniformly at random. For every ω ∈ Ω, it easy to verify the following: the probability that ω is
the actual sequence of replies that the adversary gets for his queries is 1/|Ω| in the former case, and R(ω)/|Ω|
in the latter. Suppose that the adversary uses an algorithm A. Let S ⊆ Ω be the set of sequences of replies
for which A outputs 1. Then
PAU (1) =
∑
ω∈S
1
|Ω| , P
A
TRUNCn,m◦π(1) =
∑
ω∈S
R(ω)
|Ω| ,
and the advantage of A against the PRF TRUNCn,m ◦ π is therefore
∣∣∣PATRUNCn,m◦π(1)− PAU (1)∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
ω∈S
R(ω)− 1
|Ω|
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Assuming the adversary has no computational limitations, we may conclude that
Advn,m(q) = AdvTRUNCn,m◦π(q) = max
S⊆Ω
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
ω∈S
R(ω)− 1
|Ω|
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Since
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
ω∈S
R(ω)− 1
|Ω|
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
ω∈S
R(ω)>1
R(ω)− 1
|Ω| −
∑
ω∈S
R(ω)<1
1−R(ω)
|Ω|
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max


∑
ω∈S
R(ω)>1
R(ω)− 1
|Ω| ,
∑
ω∈S
R(ω)<1
1−R(ω)
|Ω|

 ,
with equality if S = {ω ∈ Ω | R(ω) > 1} or S = {ω ∈ Ω | R(ω) < 1}, we conclude that
Advn,m(q) =
∑
ω∈Ω
R(ω)>1
R(ω)− 1
|Ω| = Emax{R− 1, 0}, (10)
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and
Advn,m(q) =
∑
ω∈Ω
R(ω)<1
1−R(ω)
|Ω| = Emax{1−R, 0}, (11)
where all expectations, here and below, are with respect to the uniform distribution on Ω. We will use the
estimates given in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. For every positive t and positive integer k ≤ t/2,
lnW (k, t) ≥ −k(k − 1)
2t
− k
2(k − 1)
3t2
(12)
and
lnW (2k, 2t) +
(
2k
2
)
1
2t
≥ 2
(
lnW (k, t) +
(
k
2
)
1
t
)
− 1
2
(
k
t
)2
(13)
Proof. For every x < 1, let ϕ(x) := x+ x2 + ln(1− x). Then for every x < 1,
ϕ′(x) = 1 + 2x− 1
1− x =
x(1 − 2x)
1− x .
Therefore, ϕ is increasing in the interval [0, 12 ]. Hence, for every 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2,
ln(1 − x) = −x− x2 + ϕ(x) ≥ −x− x2 + ϕ(0) = −x− x2. (14)
The estimate (12) immediately follows:
lnW (k, t) =
k−1∑
j=0
ln
(
1− j
t
)
≥ −
k−1∑
j=0
j
t
−
k−1∑
j=0
j2
t2
= −k(k − 1)
2t
− k(k − 1)(2k − 1)
6t2
≥ −k(k − 1)
2t
− k
2(k − 1)
3t2
.
To get (13), observe first that
W (2k, 2t)2
W (k, t)4
=
∏2k−1
j=0
(
1− j2t
)2
∏k−1
j=0
(
1− jt
)4 =
∏k−1
j=0
(
1− 2j2t
)2 (
1− 2j+12t
)2
∏k−1
j=0
(
1− 2j2t
)4
=
∏k−1
j=0
(
1− 2j+12t
)2
∏k−1
j=0
(
1− 2j2t
)2 =
∏k−1
j=0
(
1− 2j+12t
)2
∏k−1
j=0
(
1− 2j2t
) (
1− 2j+22t
) (1− k
t
)
≥ 1− k
t
.
Therefore, by (14),
lnW (2k, 2t) +
(
2k
2
)
1
2t
− 2
(
lnW (k, t) +
(
k
2
)
1
t
)
=
1
2
(
ln
W (2k, 2t)2
W (k, t)4
+
k
t
)
≥ 1
2
(
ln
(
1− k
t
)
+
k
t
)
≥ −1
2
(
k
t
)2
,
and (13) follows.
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3 Proof of Theorem 1.2
In this section we prove our main result. We first adress the regime 1 < q ≤ 2n−m2 +8, in which
min
{
q2
2n
,
q
2
n+m
2
, 1
}
= Θ
(
q2
2n
)
.
Proposition 3.1. If 1 < q ≤ 2n−m2 +8 then
Advn,m(q) = Ω
(
q2
2n
)
.
Proof. Assume first, in addition, that q ≤ 2n−m−1. Let
S :=
{
ω ∈ Ω | ∀α ∈ {0, 1}n−m : dα(ω) ≤ 1
}
.
For every ω ∈ S,
R(ω) =
1
W (q, 2n)
=
q−1∏
j=0
1
1− j2n
≥
q−1∏
j=0
(
1 +
j
2n
)
and hence
R(ω)− 1 ≥
q−1∑
j=0
j
2n
=
q(q − 1)/2
2n
.
By (12),
Pr(S) =W (q, 2n−m) = Ω(1).
Therefore, by (10),
Advn,m(q) = Emax{R− 1, 0} ≥ Pr(S)q(q − 1)/2
2n
= Ω
(
q2
2n
)
.
Now, if 2n−m−1 < q ≤ 2n−m2 +8, then by what we already proved
Advn,m(q) ≥ Advn,m(2n−m−1) = Ω
((
2n−m−1
)2
2n
)
= Ω
(
q2
2n
)
.
We now adress the regime 2
n−m
2 +8 < q ≤ 2n+m2 −3, in which
min
{
q2
2n
,
q
2
n+m
2
, 1
}
= Θ
(
q
2
n+m
2
)
.
Proposition 3.2. Assume that 2
n−m
2 +8 < q ≤ 2n+m2 −3. Then
Advn,m(q) = Ω
(
q
2
n+m
2
)
.
For ω = (ωi)
q
i=1 ∈ Ω, let
X := #{1 ≤ i < j ≤ q | ωi = ωj} −
(
q
2
)
1
2n−m
.
Proposition 3.2 will follow easily from the following technical lemmas.
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Lemma 3.3. Suppose q is a power of 2. Then
R ≤ e 12 · q(q−1)2n+m − 12mX .
The proof of Lemma 3.3 will be given in Section 4.
Lemma 3.4. If q > 2
n−m
2 +8 then
Pr
(
X >
1
10
√
q(q − 1)
2n−m
)
>
1
400
The proof of Lemma 3.4 will be given in Section 5. We will now proceed to prove Proposition 3.2
Proof of Proposition 3.2. With no loss of generality we may assume that q is a power of 2. If X(ω) >
1
10
√
q(q−1)
2n−m then
1
2
· q(q − 1)
2n+m
− 1
2m
X(ω) <
1
2
· q(q − 1)
2n+m
− 1
2m
· 1
10
√
q(q − 1)
2n−m
= − 1
10
(
1− 5
√
q(q − 1)
2n+m
)√
q(q − 1)
2n+m
< − 3
80
√
q(q − 1)
2n+m
,
hence, by Lemma 3.3,
1−R(ω) > 1− e− 380
√
q(q−1)
2n+m .
Therefore, by (11) and Lemma 3.4,
Advn,m(q) = Emax{1−R, 0} > 1
400
(
1− e− 380
√
q(q−1)
2n+m
)
= Ω
(
q
2
n+m
2
)
.
Now we can prove Theorem 1.2.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. The upper bound was already demonstrated in the introduction, so we only need to
show that
Advn,m(q) = Ω
(
min
{
q2
2n
,
q
2
n+m
2
, 1
})
.
If 1 < q ≤ 2n−m2 +8 then by Proposition 3.1
Advn,m(q) = Ω
(
q2
2n
)
.
If 2
n−m
2 +8 < q ≤ 2n+m2 −3 then by Proposition 3.2
Advn,m(q) = Ω
(
q
2
n+m
2
)
.
Finally, if q > 2
n+m
2 −3 then by Proposition 3.2
Advn,m(q) ≥ Advn,m
(
2
n+m
2 −3
)
= Ω
(
2
n+m
2 −3
2
n+m
2
)
= Ω(1).
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4 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Let D be the set of sequences (dα)α∈{0,1}n−m of non-negative integers such that dα ≤ 2m for every α ∈
{0, 1}n−m and ∑α∈{0,1}n−m dα = q.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose q is a power of 2. Then for every (dα)α∈{0,1}n−m ∈ D,
∑
α∈{0,1}n−m
lnW (dα, 2
m) +
(
dα
2
)
1
2m
≤

0 q < 2
n−m
2n−m
(
lnW
(
q
2n−m , 2
m
)
+
( q
2n−m
2
)
1
2m
)
q ≥ 2n−m
Proof. For every integer 0 ≤ d ≤ 2m, let
f(d) := lnW (d, 2m) +
(
d
2
)
1
2m
.
Note that f(0) = f(1) = 0. For every integer 0 ≤ d ≤ 2m − 1,
f(d+ 1)− f(d) = ln W (d+ 1, 2
m)
W (d, 2m)
+
((
d+ 1
2
)
−
(
d
2
))
1
2m
= ln
(
1− d
2m
)
+
d
2m
.
Hence, for every 0 ≤ d1 < d2 ≤ 2m − 1, since the function x 7→ ln(1 − x) + x is strictly decreasing in the
interval [0, 1),
f(d1 + 1)− f(d1) = ln
(
1− d1
2m
)
+
d1
2m
> ln
(
1− d2
2m
)
+
d2
2m
= f(d2 + 1)− f(d2).
For every (dα)α∈{0,1}n−m ∈ D, let
F
(
(dα)α∈{0,1}n−m
)
:=
∑
α∈{0,1}n−m
f(dα).
Suppose that (dα)α∈{0,1}n−m ∈ D and there are α1, α2 ∈ {0, 1}n−m for which dα1 + 1 ≤ dα2 − 1. For every
α ∈ {0, 1}n−m let
d˜α :=


dα α /∈ {α1, α2}
dα1 + 1 α = α1
dα2 − 1 α = α2,
then (d˜α)α∈{0,1}n−m ∈ D and
F
(
(d˜α)α∈{0,1}n−m
)
− F ((dα)α∈{0,1}n−m) = (f(dα1 + 1)− f(dα1))− (f(dα2)− f(dα2 − 1)) > 0.
Therefore, if q ≥ 2n−m then the maximum of F in D is attained at the sequence (dα)α∈{0,1}n−m such that
dα = q/2
n−m for every α ∈ {0, 1}n−m; If q < 2n−m then the maximum of F in D is attained at any
(dα)α∈{0,1}n−m ∈ D for which dα ≤ 1 for every α ∈ {0, 1}n−m. Therefore, for every (dα)α∈{0,1}n−m ∈ D,
∑
α∈{0,1}n−m
f(dα) = F
(
(dα)α∈{0,1}n−m
) ≤

0 q < 2
n−m
2n−mf
(
q
2n−m
)
q ≥ 2n−m,
i.e.,
∑
α∈{0,1}n−m
lnW (dα, 2
m) +
(
dα
2
)
1
2m
≤

0 q < 2
n−m
2n−m
(
lnW
(
q
2n−m , 2
m
)
+
( q
2n−m
2
)
1
2m
)
q ≥ 2n−m.
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Proof of Lemma 3.3. Let ω = (ωi)
q
i=1 ∈ Ω. If dα(ω) > 2m for some α ∈ {0, 1}n−m, then surely
R(ω) = 0 < e
1
2 · q(q−1)2n+m −
1
2m X(ω).
We therefore assume that dα(ω) ≤ 2m for every α ∈ {0, 1}n−m, and hence (dα(ω))α∈{0,1}n−m ∈ D. Note that
X(ω) +
(
q
2
)
1
2n−m
= #{1 ≤ i < j ≤ q | ωi = ωj} =
∑
α∈{0,1}n−m
(
dα(ω)
2
)
,
and hence
lnR(ω) + lnW (q, 2n) +
1
2m
X(ω) +
(
q
2
)
1
2n
=
∑
α∈{0,1}n−m
lnW (dα(ω), 2
m) +
(
dα(ω)
2
)
1
2m
.
If q < 2n−m then by Lemma 4.1 and (12) we conclude that
lnR(ω) ≤ − lnW (q, 2n)− 1
2m
X(ω)−
(
q
2
)
1
2n
= −
(
lnW (q, 2n) +
q(q − 1)
2 · 2n
)
− 1
2m
X(ω) ≤
≤ q
2(q − 1)
3 · 22n −
1
2m
X(ω) =
1
3
· q
2n−m
· q(q − 1)
2n+m
− 1
2m
X(ω) <
1
2
· q(q − 1)
2n+m
− 1
2m
X(ω).
If q ≥ 2n−m then by Lemma 4.1 and a repetitive use of (13),
lnR(ω) + lnW (q, 2n) +
1
2m
X(ω) +
(
q
2
)
1
2n
≤ 2n−m
(
lnW
( q
2n−m
, 2m
)
+
( q
2n−m
2
)
1
2m
)
≤ lnW (q, 2n) +
(
q
2
)
1
2n
+
(
2n−m − 1) 1
2
( q
2n
)2
,
and hence
lnR(ω) ≤ (2n−m − 1) 1
2
( q
2n
)2
− 1
2m
X(ω) ≤ 1
2
· q(q − 1)
2n+m
− 1
2m
X(ω).
5 Proof of Lemma 3.4
Lemma 5.1.
EX =0,
EX2 =
(
q
2
)
1
2n−m
(
1− 1
2n−m
)
,
EX3 =6
(
q
3
)
1
22(n−m)
(
1− 1
2n−m
)
+
(
q
2
)
1
2n−m
(
1− 1
2n−m
)(
1− 2
2n−m
)
,
EX4 =18
(
q
4
)
1
22(n−m)
(
1− 1
2n−m
)(
1 +
3
2n−m
)
+ 54
(
q
3
)
1
22(n−m)
(
1− 1
2n−m
)(
1− 5
3 · 2n−m
)
+
(
q
2
)
1
2n−m
(
1− 1
2n−m
)(
1− 3
2n−m
+
3
22(n−m)
)
.
Proof. Denote p := 1/2n−m and E := {{i, j} | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ q}. Note that
X =
∑
e∈E
(Xe − p) ,
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where for every 1 ≤ i < j ≤ q, X{i,j} is the indicator function of the event {ωi = ωj}, whose probability is
clearly p. Therefore, for every e ∈ E ,
EXe = p, (15)
hence, by linearity of expectation,
EX =
∑
e∈E
(EXe − p) = 0.
For every e1, e2 ∈ E , clearly
EXe1Xe2 =

p e1 = e2p2 e1 6= e2, (16)
hence, using (15),
E (Xe1 − p) (Xe2 − p) = EXe1Xe2 − p (EXe1 + EXe2) + p2 = EXe1Xe2 − p2 =

p(1− p) e1 = e20 e1 6= e2,
and, again by linearity of expectation, we get
EX2 = E
∑
e1,e2∈E
(Xe1 − p) (Xe2 − p) =
∑
e1,e2∈E
E (Xe1 − p) (Xe2 − p) =
∑
e∈E
p(1− p) =
(
q
2
)
p(1− p).
For every e1, e2, e3 ∈ E ,
EXe1Xe2Xe3 =


p e1 = e2 = e3
p2 |{e1, e2, e3}| = 2 or |e1 ∪ e2 ∪ e3| = 3
p3 otherwise,
(17)
hence, using (15) and (16), we conclude that
E (Xe1 − p) (Xe2 − p) (Xe3 − p)
= EXe1Xe2Xe3 − p (EXe1Xe2 + EXe1Xe3 + EXe2Xe3) + p2 (EXe1 + EXe2 + EXe3)− p3
= EXe1Xe2Xe3 − p (EXe1Xe2 + EXe1Xe3 + EXe2Xe3) + 2p3
=


p(1− p)(1 − 2p) e1 = e2 = e3
p2(1− p) the graph with edges e1, e2, e3 forms a cycle (triangle)
0 otherwise,
and, as before, we get
EX3 = 6
(
q
3
)
p2(1− p) +
(
q
2
)
p(1− p)(1− 2p).
Finally, for every e1, e2, e3, e4 ∈ E ,
EXe1Xe2Xe3Xe4 =


p e1 = e2 = e3 = e4
p2 |{e1, e2, e3, e4}| = 2 or |e1 ∪ e2 ∪ e3 ∪ e4| = 3
p4 the graph with edges e1, e2, e3, e4 forms a forest
p3 otherwise,
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hence, using (15), (16) and (17), we can conclude that
E (Xe1 − p) (Xe2 − p) (Xe3 − p) (Xe4 − p)
=EXe1Xe2Xe3Xe4 − p (EXe1Xe2Xe3 + EXe1Xe2Xe4 + EXe1Xe3Xe4 + EXe2Xe3Xe4)
+ p2 (EXe1Xe2 + EXe1Xe3 + EXe1Xe4 + EXe2Xe3 + EXe2Xe4 + EXe3Xe4)
− p3 (EXe1 + EXe2 + EXe3 + EXe4) + p4
=EXe1Xe2Xe3Xe4 − p (EXe1Xe2Xe3 + EXe1Xe2Xe4 + EXe1Xe3Xe4 + EXe2Xe3Xe4)
+ p2 (EXe1Xe2 + EXe1Xe3 + EXe1Xe4 + EXe2Xe3 + EXe2Xe4 + EXe3Xe4)− 3p4
=


p(1− p)(1− 3p+ 3p2) e1 = e2 = e3 = e4
p2(1− p)(1− 2p) |{e1, e2, e3, e4}| = 3 and |e1 ∪ e2 ∪ e3 ∪ e4| = 3 (∗)
p2(1− p)2 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ 4 : |{1 ≤ j ≤ 4 | ei = ej}| = 2 (∗∗)
p3(1− p) the graph with edges e1, e2, e3, e4 forms a cycle (quadrilateral)
0 otherwise,
and therefore
EX4 =72
(
q
4
)
p3(1− p) +
(
18
(
q
4
)
+ 18
(
q
3
))
p2(1− p)2
+ 36
(
q
3
)
p2(1− p)(1 − 2p) +
(
q
2
)
p(1− p)(1− 3p+ 3p2)
=18
(
q
4
)
p2(1− p)(1 + 3p) + 54
(
q
3
)
p2(1− p)
(
1− 5
3
p
)
+
(
q
2
)
p(1− p)(1− 3p+ 3p2).
Lemma 5.2. If q > 2
n−m
2 +8 then
EX4 <
(
q(q − 1)
2n−m
)2
.
Proof. First note that (
1− 1
2n−m
)(
1 +
3
2n−m
)
≤
(
1− 1
4
)(
1 +
3
4
)
=
21
16
(this follows by direct computation if n−m=1, and for n−m ≥ 2 since the function x 7→ (1 − x)(1 + 3x) is
increasing on [0, 1/3]), therefore
18
(
q
4
)
1
22(n−m)
(
1− 1
2n−m
)(
1 +
3
2n−m
)
< 18 · q
2(q − 1)2
24
· 1
22(n−m)
· 21
16
=
(
1− 1
26
)(
q(q − 1)
2n−m
)2
.
Next, note that (
1− 1
2n−m
)(
1− 5
3 · 2n−m
)
<
1
4
2
n−m
2
(it is clear if n−m ≥ 4, and easy to verify if 1 ≤ n−m ≤ 3). Therefore,
54
(
q
3
)
1
22(n−m)
(
1− 1
2n−m
)(
1− 5
3 · 2n−m
)
< 54
(
q
3
)
1
22(n−m)
· 1
4
2
n−m
2 < 9 · q(q − 1)
2
22(n−m)
· 1
4
2
n−m
2
< 9 · q(q − 1)
2
22(n−m)
· 1
4
· q
28
=
9
210
(
q(q − 1)
2n−m
)2
.
(∗) i.e., the graph with edges e1, e2, e3, e4 forms a triangle with a double edge.
(∗∗) in words: the four edges are divided to two pairs of double edges.
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In addition (
q
2
)
1
2n−m
(
1− 1
2n−m
)(
1− 3
2n−m
+
3
22(n−m)
)
<
1
2
· q(q − 1)
2n−m
<
1
217
(
q(q − 1)
2n−m
)2
.
Therefore, by Lemma 5.1,
EX4 <
(
1− 1
26
+
9
210
+
1
217
)(
q(q − 1)
2n−m
)2
<
(
q(q − 1)
2n−m
)2
.
We will also use the following standard consequence of Markov’s inequality.
Claim 5.3. Suppose Y is a random variable bounded above by a positive real number M , then
Pr (Y > 0) ≥ EY
M
.
Proof. The random variable M − Y is non-negative, hence by Markov’s inequality
Pr (Y ≤ 0) = Pr (M − Y ≥M) ≤ E(M − Y )
M
=
M − EY
M
= 1− EY
M
and therefore
Pr (Y > 0) = 1− Pr (Y ≤ 0) ≥ EY
M
.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. For every real x, let
ϕ(x) := −
(
x+
5
2
)2(
x− 1
10
)
(x− 5) = −x4 + 1
10
x3 +
75
4
x2 +
235
8
x− 25
8
.
For every real x,
ϕ′(x) = −4
(
x+
5
2
)(
x− 103−
√
29409
80
)(
x− 103 +
√
29409
80
)
.
Therefore, for every real x,
ϕ(x) ≤ ϕ
(
103 +
√
29409
80
)
< 200,
and hence, the random variable
Y := ϕ
(√
2n−m
q(q − 1)X
)
is bounded above by 200. By Lemma 5.1, EX = 0, EX2 ≥ 12
(
q
2
)
1
2n−m and EX
3 ≥ 0. Therefore,
EY =−
(
2n−m
q(q − 1)
)2
EX4 +
1
10
(
2n−m
q(q − 1)
)3/2
EX3 +
75
4
· 2
n−m
q(q − 1)EX
2 +
235
8
√
2n−m
q(q − 1)EX −
25
8
≥−
(
2n−m
q(q − 1)
)2
EX4 +
75
4
· 1
2
· 1
2
− 25
8
= −
(
2n−m
q(q − 1)
)2
EX4 +
25
16
,
and hence, by Lemma 5.2,
EY ≥ −1 + 25
16
=
9
16
>
1
2
.
Therefore, by Claim 5.3,
Pr
(
X >
1
10
√
q(q − 1)
2n−m
)
≥ Pr
(
1
10
<
√
2n−m
q(q − 1)X < 5
)
= Pr (Y > 0) ≥ EY
200
>
1
400
.
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6 Conclusions
Theorem 1.2 settled Problem 1 by showing that the upper bound (9) is tight for every q > 1.
Our interpretation is that the truncated permutation PRF is a tool that can use a single permutation
(selected uniformly and random) of {0, 1}n to produce a pseudo random bits stream whose length exceeds the
birthday bound.
For a concrete example consider n = 128, m = 64, and q = 264. The simplified bound in (8) indicates
it is possible to generate stream with length of 267 bytes with an upper bound of 2−32 on the distinguishing
advantage, where this bound cannot be improved fundamentally. In a real life context, consider the 128-
bit block cipher AES. It is commonly believed (per its design goal and the analyses it went through) to
be indistinguishable from a random permutation of {0, 1}128 if it is used with a 128-bit key that is chosen
uniformly at random, even if an adversary can see a very large amount of samples. Under this assumption
and the above results, it is possible to use 64-bit truncated outputs of AES as a Beyond-Birthday-Bound
PRF, with indistinguishability margin ∼ 232. The stream generation rate of this Beyond-Birthday-Bound
PRF is half the throughput of AES, and is very high on modern processors due to the existence of the AES
instructions (1.3 cycles per byte on the latest Intel processors, micro-architecture codename Skylake).
Note that truncated permutations are used in practice, due to the simplicity of this construction, as a
Beyond-Birthday-Bound PRF. Examples (specifically with m = n/2) for the use of truncated permutations
for key derivation can be seen in [5] and also in the AES-GCM-SIV emerging standard [4].
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